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THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA AS APPLIED TO
THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES
W G. McLAREN"
The principle of res 3udicata as applied to civil litigation is very
familiar. Likewise well known in the field of criminal law is the
doctrine of former jeopardy
It is apparent, however, from an examination of decisions in
criminal cases, that aside from the very restricted field of former
jeopardy, the application of the general doctrine of res 3udicata
to criminal litigation is not generally appreciated and applied.
The doctrine of former jeopardy is of course applicable only
where the two offenses are identical, and cannot be invoked if the
offenses are distinct, even in cases where the same facts give rise
to two or more criminal offenses. With the present tendency to
multiply statutory regulations and penalties, there is a consequent
increase of scope for the application of res judicata as distinguished
from former jeopardy
The cases applying the doctrine of res yudicata to criminal cases
are not at all numerous. The cases where the doctrine was applied,
as also the cases wnere the doctrine might have been applied, are
of interest. The following are perhaps typical cases
In Coffey v. U S.,' decided in 1886, Coffey was defending a
forfeiture proceeding brought by the United States against certain
property said to belong to Coffey, the forfeiture being in the nature
of penalty for an alleged violation of the Internal Revenue laws.
Coffey set up as a special defense that the acts charged in the for
feiture information were the same as were contained in a certain
criminal information theretofore filed against him, upon which in-
formation, after a trial before a jury, he had been found not guilty
The court said there was no question but that-
" * Il the fraudulent acts and attempts and intents to
defraud, alleged in the prior criminal information, and
covered by the verdict and judgment of acquittal, ema-
braced all of the acts, attempts and intents averred in the
information in this suit."
"The question, therefore, is distinctly presented,
whether such judgment of acquittal is a bar to this suit.
We are of opinion that it is."
After pointing out that one of the proceedings was civil and the
other criminal, the court said
* Of the Seattle bar.
116 U. S. 436, 29 L. EdP. 684, 6 Sup. Ct. 437.
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"Yet, where an issue raised as to the existence of the
act or fact denounced has been tried in a criminal pro-
ceeding, instituted by the United States, and a judgment
of acquittal has been rendered in favor of a particular
person, that judgment is conclusive in favor of such
person, on the subsequent trial of a suit mn rem by the
United States, where, as against him, the existence of the
same act or fact is the matter in issue, as a cause for the
forfeiture of the property prosecuted in such suit sn rem."
The court first denied the contention that the differences in the
degree of proof required in the two proceedings--that is, "beyond
reasonable doubt" and "preponderance of proof" could affect the
question of res audicata. The court said.
"The judgment of acquittal in the criminal proceeding
ascertained that the facts which were the basis of that pro-
ceeding, and are the basis of this one, and winch are made
by the statute the foundation of any puishment, personal
or pecuniary, did not e=st. This was ascertained once for
all, between the United States and the claimant, in the
criminal proceeding, so that the facts cannot be again liti-
gated between them, as the basis of any statutory punish-
ment denounced as a consequence of the existence of the
facts." (Italics ours).
Another interesting case is Stone v. U S./" decided in 1897. That
was a civil action in which Stone was being sued for conversion
of certain timber which it was alleged he had cut and removed
from the government lands. He set up in bar that he had previously
been acquitted by a jury on an indictment charging him criminally
with the removal of the same timber: The Supreme Court refused
to sustain this former acquittal as a bar. In doing so it is of interest
to note that the court, as a "m'akeweight," pointed out that hIs
acquittal in the crnminal case might have been due to the differ-
ence in the degree of proof required in a civil and a criminal case,
in this respect contradicting the opimon in the Coffey case. The
real reason for holding the plea bad, however, was that.
"An essential fact had to be proved in the criminal case
which was not necessary to be proved in the present suit,"
referring to the fact that knowledge of the government's owner-
ship of the timber was an essential element in the criminal case,
but was not an element of a civil liability for a conversion.
In U S. v. Oppenheimer,3 decided in 1916, the opinion is by
Justice Holmes. In that case the defendant had been indicted for
a conspiracy to conceal assets from a trustee in bankruptcy He
'167 U. S. 178, 42 L. Ed. 127, 17 Sup. Ct. 778.
3 242 U. S. 85, 61 L. Ed. 161, 37 Sup. Ct. 68.
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set up as a bar the fact that the court had held a former indict-
ment for the same offense barred by the one year statute of limita-
tions, which the court said was "an adjudication, since held to
be wrong in another case." The court said
"Upon the merits the proposition of the government is
that the doctrine of res judicata does not exist for criminal
cases except in the modified form of the 5th Amendment,
that a person shall not be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, and the conclu-
sion is drawn that a decision upon a plea in bar cannot
prevent a second trial when the defendant never has been
in jeopardy in the sense of being before a jury upon the
facts of the offense charged. It seems that the mere state-
ment of the position should be its own answer. It cannot
be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so right-
fully mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those
that protect from a liability in debt. It cannot be that a
judgment of acquittal on the ground of the statute of lim-
tations is less a protection against a second trial than a
judgment upon the ground of innocence, or that such a
judgment is any more effective when entered after a ver
dict than if entered by the government's consent before a
jury is impaneled."
Still more recently in the case of Collins v. Lossel,4 the court held
that the 5th Amendment providing against double jeopardy was not
intended to supplant the fundamental principle of res judicata
in criminal cases.
In Frank v. Mangum,5 the court again recognized that-
" 1 * * a question of fact or of law distinctly put in
issue and directly determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction cannot afterwards be disputed between the
same parties. The principle is as applicable to the decisions
of criminal courts as to those of civil jurisdiction."
Of course both in civil and in criminal cases the record of and
the proceedings in the former trial must be examined in order to
ascertain what particular issues were actually therein adjudicated.
As the United States Supreme Court said in the civil case of
Oklahoma v. Texas"
"What was involved and determined in the former suit
is to be tested by an examination of the record and pro-
ceedings therein, including the pleadings, the evidence
submitted, the respective contentions of the parties, and
the findings and opinion of the court, there being no sug-
262 U. S. 426, 67 L. Ed. 1062, 43 Sup. Ct. 618 (1927).
237 U. S. 309, 59 L. Ed. 969, 35 Sup. Ct. 582 (1915).
256 U. S. 70, 65 L. Ed. 831, 41 Sup. Ct. 420 (1921).
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gestion that tins is a proper case for resorting to extrinsic
evidence."
In United States v. Rachmil,7 the District Court sustaaned a
motion to quash an indictment for attempting to evade the income
tax, on the ground that there had been a previous adjudication in
favor of the defendant in a charge involving identical issues. In
the previous charge the defendant had been acquitted of having
conspired to defraud the United States by attempting to defeat
and evade the income tax. The District Court held this plea good
because the overt act charged in the conspiracy indictment upon
which the defendant had been acquitted, was the same act as con-
stituted the alleged attempt in the latter indictment. The court
said
"Upon a trial of the present indictment, the issue as to
whether the return filed was false and fraudulent, would
be a fundamental proposition. That issue was involved in
the previous trial, and to permit it to be litigated again
would cone so close to an encroachment upon the consti-
tutional rights of the defendants as to warrant me to-
quash the present indictment."
It will be noted that even here the court, while reaching with
some misgivings the correct conclusion, seems to have been in-
fluenced solely by "constitutional" grounds, namely, the- consti-
tutional provision against former jeopardy, although the opinion
by Justice Holmes in the Oppenheimer case, supra, had been
handed down some five years earlier.
In U S. v. McConnell,8 the District Court of Pennsylvania sus-
tained a plea in bar based upon a previous acquittal, although the
offenses involved were quite distinct in law The later indictment
charged a conspiracy to permit certain violations of the National
Prohibition Act by the issuance of fraudulent liquor withdrawal
permits. The previous case, in which the defendant had prevailed,
had charged him with conspiracy to defraud the United States by
the issuance of the same liquor permits. As illustrating the fact
that it is the identity of issues that controls the application of the
doctrine, the court said.
"It appears conclusively that guilty knowledge con-
cermng each of the permits upon which the several counts
in the indictment now before us are based was in issue
in the former indictment, and that the prosecution failed
to produce any evidence of guilty knowledge of the three
defendants now under indictment concerning any of the
permits mentioned in the present indictment."
7270 Fed. 869 (1921).
'10 F (2d) 977 (1926).
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And on page 980, the court, in looking into the issues of fact
which had been determined, pointed out that the foundation ele-
ment in each case was the unlawful issuance of permits with
knowledge.
In United States v. Meyerson,9 the District Court of New York
refused to grant certain motions to quash insofar as they were
based upon a plea of former jeopardy, since the offenses in ques-
tion were quite distinct. The court said
"The prior judgment of acquitaal is, however, con-
clusive upon all questions of fact or of law distinctly put
in issue and directly determined upon the trial of the
former indictment." Citing cases.
"If upon the former trial the innocence of Katz of any
participation in the conspiracy now charged against hun
was adjudicated and determined, the pending indictment
should be quashed as against him."
In closing, the court said
"Katz's participation in the scheme, whether it be
called a scheme to defraud or a conspiracy, is no longer
open to inquiry in any proceeding between him and the
United States. Nor can the effect of the former adjudica-
tion of the acquittal be avoided by adding new elements to
the old scheme, and thus broadening the charge of con-
spiracy "
It is manifest, therefore, that the extent to which a plea of
res judicata in a criminal charge may be a defense, depends upon
what issues of facts or of law were actually determined in the
former trial, and whether any of such determinations would have
to be controverted by the prosecution in order to procure a con-
viction of the second offense. It might well happen that an acquittal
had been obtained in the first case on account of some issue not
essential in the second case.
The case of State v. Danhof,10 we believe furnishes an instance
where the doctrine of res judicata was applicable and if applied
would have procured an acquittal of the defendant. It appears
from the opinion that Danhof was charged and convicted of hav-
ing fished on December 19, 1929, at a certain place with an ap-
pliance other than hook and line, contrary to a certain section of
the code. At the trial he relied upon former jeopardy and to sustain
that plea introduced the record of his prosecution and acquittal in
a previous case, in which it was charged that on the same date he
had fished with an appliance other than a hook and line without
'24 F (2d) 855 (1928).
10 161 Wash. 441, 297 Pac. 195 (1931).
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havmng a license so to do. The trial court held that tns was a bar
and discharged the defendant. The state appealed. It is of interest
to note that both the trial and appellate court as well as counsel,
considered the situation as merely involving former jeopardy The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court, saying-
"It is apparent there are two distinct offenses." 11
It is possible, of course, that Danhof may have procured his
acquittal in the first case by showing that he had a license. Such
an acquittal would not have involved a determination of the issue
of fact whether or not he had committed the acts of fishing charged.
This possibility is not, however, referred to by the court, and in
the later decision of State v. Phillips,2 the same court, in referring
to the Danhof case, said at page 612
"t 0 * the two prosecutions were based on the same
evidence."
If this be true, then the state should not have been allowed to
relitigate against Danhof the issues of fact regarding his having
fished at the time and place in question. This issue had been
adjudicated once and for all against the state.
In the Phillips case,' 3 the charge upon which the defendant was
convicted was that on June 25, 1933, he had unlawfully bought,
received and concealed a certain automobile knowing it to have
been stolen. He pleaded in defense a former acquittal in wnch
the charge was that he had on April 21, 1933, unlawfully taken
and driven away a certain automobile. Apparently this plea did not
receive attention during the trial in the second case, and Phillips
was convicted. Thereafter a motion was made to vacate the judg-
ment on the ground of this inadvertence in not urging this plea.
The lower court's order contains the following recital.
"* * * it appearing to the court that even conceding
although not deciding that said charges were tried on the
same evidence and were identical as a matter of fact, that
even if such were the case that an inquiry in that regard
is not necessary, sn that such charges are not sdentical as
a matter of law."
Here again, the situation is treated as presenting nothing more
than a plea of former jeopardy The possible application of the
1 One for fishing without a license, and the other for fish-ng at the
Drohibited place, -whether with or -without a license.
12179 Wash. 607, 38 P. (2d-) 372 (1934).
Is Ibid.
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broader principle of res judicata was apparently not given any
consideration. The Supreme Court, in passing upon this situation,
took the same viewpoint as shown by the following quotation from
its opinion.
"That the plea of former acquittal shall relate to the
same offense and is governed by that test rather than to
the facts or acts upon which the same ss based, is also
settled by the authorities in this and other states, "
(Italics supplied)
The court then discusses four of its own decisions, including the
Danhof case.14 The cited cases of State v. Peck," and State v. Kings-
bury, 6 do not aid the present discussion because in each of those
cases the defendants had been convicted of offenses which were
distinct. The fourth case referred to by the Supreme Court is that
of State v. Relff 17 In that case it appears that the Supreme Court
also treated the situation as presenting merely the plea of former
jeopardy, citing the State Constitution with reference thereto.
In the Phillips case the Supreme Court, throughout its opinion,
confines the matter to the question of former jeopardy, saying-
"The test fixed by the statute is that the former acquit-
tal shall be of the same offense."
It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain from the record in
the Phillips case whether the issues which were adjudicated in
Phillips' favor in the first case did include any of the issues which
were essential to his conviction in the second case. The possibilities
in that direction were not considered by either the trial or the
appellate court in the consideration of the case.
In view of the vigor with which the Supreme Court of the
United States, speaking through Justice Holmes in one instance
and through Justice Brandeis in another, has applied the full
force of the doctrine of res judicata to criminal cases, it would
seem that those charged with crime have not in all cases received
the full measure of protection to which they were entitled by
reason of former acquittals on charges involving issues of fact or
of law common to both charges, even though the nature of the
offenses may be entirely distinct.
"161 Wash. 441, 297 Pac. 195 (1931) cited note 10, supra.
' 146 Wash. 101, 261 Pac. 779 (1927).
147 Wash. 426, 266 Pac. 174 (1928).
17 .4 Wash. 664, 45 Pac. 318 (1896).
